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Abstract
We implement a simple two-shop search model in the laboratory with
the aim to investigate if consumers behave di¤erently in equivalent situations,
where prices are displayed either as net prices or as gross prices with discounts
. We compare treatments, where we either depict the known price of the rst
shop or the initially uncertain price of the second shop as a gross price with
a discount, with treatments without discounts. We nd that subjects search
less in both treatments with discounts. Hence, we conclude that retailers can
use this framing e¤ect in order to reduce the competitiveness in their market,
since decreased search intensities dampen competitive pressure.
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Retail-price promotions are ubiquitous in modern markets. Motivated by di¤erent
marketing strategies, promotions can take various forms: in-store price discounts,
coupons, mail-in rebates, etc. The di¤erent forms of price promotions share at least
two characteristics. Firstly, the promotional price is only available for some limited
time. When the promotion is over, the goods revert to their regular (higher) prices.
Therefore, at di¤erent times the buyer may be charged di¤erent prices on identical
products due to a sellersintertemporal price variation. Secondly, the promotional
price is usually presented alongside the regular (full) price. Sellers often post the
regular price with a discount in either percentage terms (e.g., 20% o¤ the marked
price) or absolute value (e.g., $10 o¤). Economists have mainly devoted their
research to explaining the rst feature of price promotion, believing that random
variation of underlying demand or cost conditions is not a su¢ cient explanation for
price variations. Most theories concerned explain the variations with intertemporal
price discrimination, where sellers vary their prices extracting more surplus from
consumers with di¤erent product valuations.1
The second common characteristic of price promotions, the discount frame, is
typically ignored by economists. The reason for this is simple. The behavior of
a rational informed consumer with stable preferences should not depend on how
the price is framed. Why is it then that rms typically do not just show the net
price? Do buyers react di¤erently if sellers post regular prices with discounts rather
than simply post the reduced net prices? To answer these questions this paper
investigates if the framing of prices a¤ects consumer-search behavior. We further
ask if consumers reactions to price promotions o¤er an explanation to why rms
typically prefer to display gross prices with discounts instead of net prices. We make
use of the methodology of experimental economics for our purpose.
Understanding consumersreactions to price framing (as gross or net prices) is
1Conlisk et al. (1984), Gul et al. (1986), Bagnoli et al. (1989), Sobel (1991) and Dudey (1996)
investigate situations where monopolists can successfully and protably discriminate. Sobel (1984),
Gale (1993), Dana Jr. (1998) and Bayer (2010) show that intertemporal price discrimination can
also occur in more competitive markets.
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important. If consumers are not immune to the framing of prices then this has
an impact on how we should judge rmsuse of the discount frame. We mainly
think of the impact on consumersprice-search behavior here. In a world where
consumers are not ex ante perfectly informed about prices and have to spend time,
e¤ort and sometimes also money to learn what di¤erent sellers charge for the same
product, the way consumers search has a strong impact on the market power of
rms. Just think of the extreme example of costly consumer search leading to local
monopolies in the Diamond (1971) model. In models with consumer search and
advertising, the search intensity (as induced by search cost, price expectations, and
other things) has a strong impact on pricing behavior. Ceteris paribus the more
consumers are inclined to search the stronger is the pressure to compete on price.
Prices decrease and welfare increases with the search intensity (Butters 1977, Stahl
1989, Robert and Stahl 1993). Our question becomes now the following: does price
framing impact on consumer behavior when they search for the lowest price? If yes,
does it increase search intensity or reduce the intensity? The latter would provide a
rationale for why rms use the discount frame. A decreased search intensity reduces
price elasticities of demand, and ceteris paribus higher prices are more sustainable.
For obvious reasons there is a large literature on the impact of price framing in
marketing. Marketing researchers focus on comparing the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent
forms of price promotions in boosting sales. Krishna et al. (2002) provide a meta-
analysis of 20 publications on how price presentation a¤ects consumersperceived
savings from price promotions and thereby inuences their probability to purchase
a certain product. The study shows that the buyersperception of the promotion
value is inuenced by both price-framing e¤ects (e.g., whether a reference price is
provided) and situational e¤ects (e.g., whether the price promotion is on a national
brand or a generic brand). The typical methodology used in these studies is to
survey student subjects on their perceived savings of a particular price framing
and ask them either to rate their likelihood to purchase or to make real purchase
decisions. Conclusions are drawn by comparing the rating or the behavior of subjects
across di¤erent price framing formats. Typically, studies in this tradition su¤er from
some lack of control. Important factors like buyersvaluation, quality or attributes
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of the product or beliefs about prices distributions in the market place are usually
not appropriately controlled for. Hence, a clean isolation of the framing e¤ect is not
possible in these studies. The ndings indicate that price framing might have an
impact though. Therefore, we implement an extremely simple search environment
with price framing in the laboratory that provides the maximum amount of control
and makes a clean separation of price-framing e¤ects possible.
The search environment we implement is borrowed from economic consumer-
search theory. Theoretical papers determine optimal search rules of a rational
decision maker searching for the lowest among dispersed o¤ers in di¤erent envir-
onments (Stigler 1961; Kohn and Shavell 1974; Gastwirth 1976; Rothschild 1974;
Manning and Morgan 1982; Morgan and Manning 1985). Regardless of di¤ering
environmental assumptions in these papers, the optimal search rule is always based
on a comparison of expected benets from searching (the possibility to nd a lower
price) and the cost associated with search (e.g., shoe-leather cost). In order to max-
imize experimental control we choose the simplest of all search environments in this
tradition. A consumer with a given valuation for a good is at a shop and knows the
price charged there, which has been drawn from a known distribution. The decision
is now either to buy or to go to a second shop where the price is yet unknown.
The distribution the price in the second shop was drawn from is known though.
Moving to the next shop is costly, and once the consumer has moved the o¤er of the
initial shop is not available anymore. This search task basically becomes a choice
between a certain payout and a lottery (as in e.g. Holt and Laury 2002). In this
setup it is possible to frame the exactly same search task in three di¤erent ways:
without any discounts, with a discount frame in the initial shop and with a discount
frame in the second shop. Equivalence of the search task across the three di¤erent
framing conditions can be achieved by shifting the price distributions to o¤set the
discounts. If subjects are una¤ected by the discount frame then behavior in these
three conditions should be identical.
We also vary the price distributions of both shops to check if the relative price
reputation of the shops interacts with the e¤ect of price framing on search behavior.
For each type of price framing, we have three di¤erent treatments with the expected
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price in the second shop being higher, equal and lower than that in the rst shop.
This 33 design allows us to test: (i) if price framing changes consumer behavior; (ii)
how expectations about the relative expected prices between the initial and second
shop impact on search and (iii) if there are interaction e¤ects between framing and
relative expected prices. To our knowledge this is the rst experiment that can
cleanly answer these questions.2
In order to be able to identify potential price-framing e¤ects we structurally es-
timate the risk-preferences from our data with the null hypothesis that there are no
di¤erences across our nine treatments, as this is what standard theory predicts. We
nd that risk parameters vary across treatments with di¤erent price frames, while
they do not signicantly di¤er between treatments with di¤erent relative expected
prices within a price-frame. The latter observation gives us some condence that
our structural model is properly specied, whereas the former observation provides
evidence for price-framing e¤ects.3 We nd two interesting price-framing e¤ects.
Firstly, compared to the scenario without discounts, a discount framing in the ini-
tial shop reduces the subjects inclination to take risk and go to the second shop
even when the net prices are identical. This e¤ect is larger in early periods of our ex-
periment and is signicantly reduced in later rounds. We conjecture that a discount
being o¤ered at shop, where a consumer already is, has strong salience and leads
to the consumer putting a large value on it, while experience reduces the salience.
Secondly, consumers are inclined to take less risk if the second shop is known to
o¤er a discount than in the equivalent treatment without discounts. This e¤ect is
persistent and does not disappear with repetition. At rst one might nd this result
odd, as intuition might suggest the opposite: consumers being lured to the second
shop by discounts. It makes perfect sense if one thinks about salience though. The
expected gross price is higher in the second shop (by the amount of the discount).
Since the consumer has to decide while not being in the second shop (i.e. having
2There exist some experimental studies which implement similar search models in the laboratory
(e.g. Schotter and Braunstein 1981; Braunstein and Schotter 1982; Kogut 1990; Kogut 1992; Cox
and Oaxaca 1989;Cox and Oaxaca 1992). These experiments were only designed for testing if
subjects adhere to optimal search rules typically assuming risk-neutrality.
3It remains a philosophical question whether the price framing e¤ect leads to biased behavior
or if it impacts on risk-preferences.
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not yet experienced the discount), the salience of the discount is low compared to
that of the gross price distribution. The value of the discount in the future shop is
undervalued and the search intensity is reduced.
The main insight from our paper is that both the price-framing e¤ect of discounts
in shops that are visited and that of discounts in shops consumers consider to visit
point in the same direction. The use of the discount frame reduces the inclination of
consumers to take risk and to search for a better price. So rms using the discount
frame without actually reducing net prices are able to reduce the competitiveness
of markets, as it reduces the price elasticity of demand through a reduced search
intensity of consumers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the experimental design and the standard theoretical predictions for the underlying
model. In Section 3 we provide summary statistics of buyersdecisions. In Section
4 we report on the structural estimation of the risk preferences using maximum
likelihood estimation, followed by a discussion of explanations for the framing e¤ect
in Section 5. Finally, we o¤er some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 The experiment
Typically, search models and the computation of the resulting optimal stopping rule
can be quite complex. In this experiment, our aim is to test neither the theoretical
search models nor the computation ability of our subjects. Therefore, we chose
an extremely simple search environment in order to minimize the calculation e¤ort
required by subjects. The treatments consist of variations of a simple search task.
2.1 A baseline search task
Subjects are asked to buy one unit of a homogeneous good which is worth v monetary
units to them. There exist two sequentially located shops (1 and 2), selling this
good. The price o¤ered by each shop is randomly and independently drawn from
commonly known distributions. The subjects know the price distributions of both
shops in advance, but not the particular prices o¤ered by each shop. Following the
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convention in search theory, the price quoted in shop 1; once it is determined, is
given to the subjects for free. After observing this price (p1) subjects face three
options:
1. Exit, which yields zero prot.
2. Buy at p1. The payo¤ is equal to the valuation (v) less the net price to be
paid. Note that depending on the specic treatment, the net price subjects
have to pay may equal pi (when shop 1 does not o¤er a discount) or p1   d1,
where d1 denotes a discount o¤ered by shop 1.
3. Search (i.e., the subject pays a search cost c to visit shop 2 and to learn the
price p2 charged there). Recall is not possible. Once search is chosen the price
in shop 1 is no longer available. After search subjects face two further choices:
(a) Buy at p2. The prot is given by v  p2   c in the treatments where shop
2 does not o¤er a discount and as v   (p2   d2)  c otherwise.
(b) Exit with a loss of c.
2.2 Treatments
Built upon on this baseline search task, our experiment consists of nine treatments
(Table 1). The buyersvaluation (v = 200) and the search cost (c = 5) are held
constant across all treatments. The prices o¤ered by both shops are drawn from
uniform distributions, which serves the purpose of keeping the search problem as
simple as possible. The nine treatments result from a three-step variation in the
two dimensions of price framing and price distributions.
Along the rst dimension, we can classify the three di¤erent types of treatments
as No-D, Shop1-D, and Shop2-D, which correspond to there is no discount in any
shop, only shop 1 o¤ers a discount and only shop 2 o¤ers a discount. The
No-D treatments (T1, T4, T7 ) implement the baseline search model with di¤erent
incentives for search, which come from the di¤erent price distributions used. In the
Shop1-D treatments (T2, T5, T8 ) a discount of d1 = 15 is granted in shop 1, while




L-Incentive: T1: T2: T3:
p12[60,160] p12[75,175] p12[60,160]
p22[75,175] p22[75,175] p22[90,190]
M-Incentive: T4: T5: T6:
p12[75,175] p12[90,190] p12[75,175]
p22[75,175] p22[75,175] p22[90,190]
H-Incentive: T7: T8: T9:
p12[75,175] p12[90,190] p12[75,175]
p22[60,160] p22[60,160] p22[75,175]
v = 200; c = 5, p1 and p2 are drawn from uniform distributions.
Table 1: A summary of the parameter values by treatment.
gross price distributions in shop 1 are moved up by 15 monetary units. This exactly
o¤sets the discount. In the Shop2-D treatments (T3, T6, T9 ) the discount of 15
monetary units applies to purchases in shop 2 and the gross price distributions are
again shifted, such that the discount is perfectly o¤set. As the price distributions and
the discounts are communicated to the subjects, the underlying decision problems
across the framing conditions are identical within the same incentive category, as
the net price distributions are identical.
On the other dimension, we vary the incentive to search by shifting the relative
location of the price distributions in shop 1 and 2. The three di¤erent incentive
categories are denoted as L-Incentive, M-Incentive and H-Incentive, where L, M, H
stand for low, medium and high, respectively. Loosely speaking, the ex ante search
incentive increases if the relative expected price in shop 2 decreases while everything
else is constant. InM-Incentive treatments (T4, T5, T6 ), the net-price distributions
from which the two shops draw their prices are both uniform on the interval [75; 175].
In the L-Incentive treatments (T1 , T2 , T3 ) the net-price distribution of shop 1 is
stochastically dominated by that of shop 2 (uniform on [60; 160] in shop 1 versus
[75; 175] in shop 2). This relationship is reversed in the H-Incentive treatments (T7,
T8, T9 ), where a lower expected net-price is assigned to shop 2. This design makes
it possible to isolate the impact of price framing on search decisions for the three
di¤erent incentive categories. The variation of the incentive to search is useful for
the identication of interaction e¤ects between framing and expectations.
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2.3 Experimental procedure
The search task was programmed and implemented in the laboratory using z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). We conducted all experimental sessions at AdLab, the Adelaide
University Laboratory for Experimental Economics. In each session, one treatment
was randomly assigned to each subject. Within a treatment the same search task
was repeated 20 times. The price distributions and the availability of the discount
were not changed throughout a treatment. The procedure, the search task and the
payo¤s were explained to the subjects in written instructions that we distributed
in advance. The subjects were paid privately at the end of their session according
to their performance (Experimental Dollars were converted into Australian Dollars
at a given exchange rate). In total, 226 university students from various disciplines
participated in the experiment. They earned on average 9.2AUD in approximately
30 minutes.4 The subjects had no experience with similar tasks in the laboratory
and repeated participation was not allowed.
2.4 The benchmark predictions
Before we report our ndings, it is important to illustrate the theoretical predictions
of a rational buyers behavior as a benchmark. Firstly, exit is obviously a strictly
dominated option in both stages given the parameter values we applied. In all treat-
ments, buy generates a positive prot even if the highest possible price is drawn,
whilst exit gives either 0 or  5. We included this apparently dominated option
as a low-level rationality check. Secondly, as illustrated in the section on treat-
ment design, the search problems (in di¤erent price-discount frames) are objectively
identical when the search incentive is held constant. Note that this implies that a
subject who is una¤ected by framing e¤ects should use the same decision rule for all
decision problems within one incentive condition, regardless of her risk preferences.
Denoting the expected search intensity (fraction of search) in treatment j as Sj ,
















T9 should hold if
4We combined our experiment with some other totally unrelated experiments. It took 1.5 to 2
hours in total for the whole session in which the search task was always run at the beginning.
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the risk preferences of subjects are distributed identically across treatments, which
we ensure by randomly assigning subjects to treatments. Lastly, as we increase the
ex ante incentive to search while holding the price framing constant, Sj should in-


































Sj : predicted search intensity in treatment j
Table 2: The predicted relations of search intensities across treatments.
3 A rst look at search behavior
Before we investigate individual search behavior, we rst present an overview over
observed decisions. Among 4520 observations, we observe 20 (i.e., 0:44%) instances
of exits in shop 1. We also observe a small amount of irrational exits in the second
stage (69 out of 2338, 2:95%). We conclude from the small proportion of obviously
irrational behavior that the subjects in general understood the search task.
Compared to the three theoretical predictions made in Section 2.4, the average
search behavior shows certain regularities, which do not perfectly agree with theory.
We nd that although the search intensity in general increases as the incentive
to search increases, we do not observe identical search intensities across di¤erent
price presentations, when the search incentive is held constant. The observed search
intensity generally increases as the price expectation for shop 2 (relative to that
of the shop 1) decreases. In the L-Incentive treatments, the average fraction of
buyers who search is 40:91% (No-D), 44:44% (Shop1-D) and 32:94% (Shop2-D).
This fraction generally increases to 54:46%, 48:67% and 45:71% in the M-Incentive
treatments, respectively, and further increases to 58:39%, 58:89% and 57:92% in
the H-Incentive treatments, respectively. The variation of search frequencies along
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the incentive dimension therefore roughly follows the theoretical prediction. Higher
search incentives lead to more searching. This is reassuring. However, comparing the
search fractions within the incentive dimension shows that they are not necessarily
the same. Note that the unconditional search fractions do not necessarily give a
conclusive picture, as they cannot account for di¤erent draws of the prices in shop
1 across treatments. For this reason we investigate how the search intensities relate
to the prices in shop 1 and compare this within the same incentive level.
Figure 1 plots the relation between smoothed search fractions and the net price in
shop 1 for a given level of search incentives.5 We provide the same graphs separately
for the data from the rst and the second half of the experiment. The left panel of
the graph shows that in the rst ten periods subjects searched more in the No-D
treatments than in the Shop1-D or Shop2-D treatments. This is true for all incentive
levels. Initially both discount frames regardless of where the discount is given 
seem to reduce the search intensity at given net prices in shop 1: The di¤erence
becomes smaller in the second half of the experiment, as the right panel shows. But
there is still less searching if the discount is o¤ered in the shop with the unknown
price (Shop2-D treatments) then in the other two framing conditions. It is hard to
tell from the graphs if the searching intensity is still di¤erent between the Shop2-D
frame, with the discount in shop one (Shop1-D) and the net price framing (No-D).
Overall the aggregate results provide some support for the existence of price-
framing e¤ects on consumer search behavior. At the same time there is also some
support for the theoretical predictions, as the search intensity increases with the
incentives to search and the di¤erences along the price-frame dimension appear to
become smaller in the second half of the experiment. In the next section we provide
a more in-depth analysis, which exploits that under standard assumptions the search
decision should depend only on the observed price in shop 1, the price distribution
in shop 2 and the risk preferences of the subject.
5For the graphs we used locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS, Cleveland 1979 )
with bandwidth 0.8.
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Figure 1: Lowess smoothing probability of search by treatment and period
4 Structural estimation of risk preferences
Our experiments implement a model of consumer search under uncertainty. The
cuto¤ price (i.e., the lowest price in shop 1 where a consumer decides to search)
depends on the price distribution at the second shop, search cost and the risk prefer-
ences of the consumer. In our analysis uncovering risk preferences is crucial, as they
are unobserved, while the other determinants have been controlled for. Previous ex-
perimental studies aiming to test search theory typically compare their observations
to the theoretical predictions under risk-neutrality. This approximation can greatly
reduce the computational demand in solving complex search models, especially when
the time horizon is nite. However, risk neutrality is a strong assumption. Our
simple design allows us to relax this assumption and conduct a structural estima-
tion of underlying risk-aversion coe¢ cients. The estimation is based on expected
utility theory (EUT) and the noisy probabilistic choice model proposed by Holt and
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Laury (2002). In our estimation we allow the risk-aversion coe¢ cient to depend
on subject characteristics and on treatments. Signicantly di¤erent risk parameters
across treatments then provide evidence for price-framing e¤ects.
4.1 An expected utility maximizers decision rule
We assume that the utility function is dened by u(x) = xr (for x > 0), where x is
the monetary payo¤ and r is the risk parameter to be estimated. A utility function
of this form exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). We believe that CRRA
is appropriate, as the stakes in our experiment are moderate. Decisions in gambles
that do not signicantly change an individuals lifetime wealth can be appropriately
described by CRRA. The risk parameter r implies risk proclivity (being risk loving)
for r > 1, risk-neutrality for r = 1, and risk-aversion for r < 1.
The consumers in our experiments have to choose between a safe payo¤ from
buying (yielding an utility U(B)) and a lottery over the prices at shop 2 resulting
in an expected utility EU(S) from searching.6 The values of U(B) and EU(S) are
calculated according to the following expressions:




f(p) [200  p2net   5]r dp: (2)
Here f(p) denotes the density function of the price distribution; p and p are
the lower and upper bounds of the price distribution and p1net and p2net are the
net prices charged. The density function of our uniform distribution is given by
f(p) = 1
a
, where a = p  p = 100. Therefore, EU(S) can be expressed as a function
of the unknown risk parameter r:
EU(S) =
(195  p)r+1   (195  p)r+1
100(r + 1)
(3)
A rational expected utility maximizer should always choose the option which
6The utility from buying also depends on p1net:We omit this in the text to enhance readability.
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yields the higher expected utility. The probability of search in this case is a step
function:
prob(S j p1net) =
8<: 1 if EU(S) > U(B; p1net)0 if EU(S)  U(B; p1net) (4)
If we allow individuals to make decision errors then we would at least expect
that the probability of search increases with the di¤erence, i.e., EU(S)  U(B). A
simple probabilistic decision rule capturing this is:









prob(B j p1net) = 1  prob(S j p1net) (6)
This formulation is exible with respect to the likelihood of errors. As the noise
() in the decision process increases, subjects will become less sensitive to payo¤
di¤erences between the two alternatives and hence make decisions more randomly.
To the extreme, if  approaches innity the probability of search will approach one-
half, regardless of the values of U(B) and EU(S). Subjects make purely random
choices when the noise is innitely large. On the other hand, when  approaches
0 the probability of choosing the option with higher (expected) payo¤ approaches
1 and the decision maker becomes fully rational. With Equations (5) and (6) we
have a model of noisy consumer search that can easily be put to the data. The
probability of search depends on known variables (net price in shop 1, the net-price
distribution in shop 2) and on the two unknown parameters  and r, which we will
estimate.
4.2 Maximum likelihood estimation
Assuming that subjects make decisions according to the probabilistic choice rule
stated above, the risk parameter r and the noise parameter  can both be estimated
using maximum likelihood estimation. As we are interested in how search behavior
is inuenced by price framing, we allow the risk parameter to vary across treatments.
To control for the impact of individual characteristics of our subjects, we also allow
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the risk parameter to vary with demographic variables such as age, gender and
background in mathematics. In addition, as we repeat the same task 20 times,
we also include time e¤ects and their interactions with treatments to capture the
potential behavioral changes over time. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that
subjects get better at the task as the experiment progresses (i.e., subjects learn
and gradually make fewer errors). For this reason we allow the noise parameter ()
to change over time (Period). The estimation equations for br and b are given in
Equations (7) and (8), followed by explanations of the independent variables.
br = br0 + (brDiscount Discount) + (brIncentive  Incentive)












 (Inc  T10+)

(7)
b = b0 + (bPeriod  Period) (8)
 Discount is a set of dummies indicating from which price-framing condition
the observation is taken (No-D, Shop1-D, Shop2-D). The base treatment is
the No-D treatment. This set of dummies is included in order to test if price
framing alters the subjectsunderlying risk preferences.
 Incentive is a set of dummy variables (L-Incentive,M-Incentive andH-Incentive),
which indicates the three di¤erent incentive conditions from which the obser-
vations were taken. L-Incentive treatments are omitted in the estimation as
the base category. This set of dummies can be used to test if shifting the price
distribution in shop 2 alters risk preferences.7
 Characteristics is a set of dummies and categorical variables, which contain
information on the subjects. This set of variables is included mainly as a
control. Male is a dummy variable to control for gender di¤erences, where
7Note that a systematic persistent e¤ect could also point into the direction of mis-specication
of the utility function. We will discuss this in a later section.
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female is the base group. Age is a categorical variable which classies the sub-
jects into three age groups: Age26 , Age26-30, Age30+. The group Age26 
contains the majority of observations and is used as base group. Math is a
dummy variable to dene whether or not a subject has a good background
in mathematics (measured as the level of high school math the subject has
taken). Course is a categorical variable which divides the subjects into stu-
dents of Science, Comm/Fin (Commerce/Finance), Economics, Engineering,
Law, Medicine, Arts and Other. Science is used as the base group.
 The last category of dummy variables is the time dummy and its interactions
with the treatment dummies. T10+ is a dummy variable to distinguish the
observations in the last ten periods from those in the rst ten periods. In
addition, Disc*T10+ and Inc*T10+ are two sets of dummies generated by in-
teracting treatment dummies with the time dummy. They are No-D*T10+,
Shop1-D*T10+, Shop2-D*T10+ in the former set and L-Incentive*T10+ , M-
Incentive*T10+ and H-Incentive*T10+ in the latter set. The rst interaction
in each group is omitted in the estimation.
4.3 Estimation results
The estimation results are presented in Table 3. The standard errors allow for
error clustering within a subject. Recall that an increase in the risk parameter r
indicates a higher propensity to take risks, where r = 1 (risk neutrality) separates
risk-averse subjects (r < 1) from risk lovers (r > 1). The risk parameter of a base-
category subject is around 1:415, which indicates risk-seeking, while the resulting
risk coe¢ cient for the second half of the experiment is not signicantly di¤erent from
risk neutrality anymore (p > 0:96).8 The estimated noise parameter starts o¤ with
0:276 in period one. This value is much higher than the value (0:134) estimated by
Holt and Laury (2002) for the binary lottery choice task. This is not surprising, since
the search task itself is more complex than just making binary lottery choices. The
8However, this only applies to those who are female science students aged 26 or younger, having
not studied higher level math in high school, playing in the L-incentive and No-D treatment in
the rst ten periods.
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amount of noise in the decision process signicantly decreases over time (Period) as
subjects become familiar with the task. In period 20, the estimated noise parameter
is 0:116, which indicates a very reasonable level of rationality.
Variable Coe¢ cient Variable Coe¢ cientbr= br0(constant) 1.415*** Math 0.469***
(0.342) (0.161)
Shop1-D -0.784*** Age26-30 0.100
(0.236) (0.192)
Shop2-D -0.756*** Age30+ 0.044
(0.224) (0.244)
Shop1-D*T10+ 0.566** Engineering 0.215
(0.256) (0.230)
Shop2-D*T10+ 0.346 Medicine 0.552***
(0.237) (0.212)
M-Incentive -0.277 Economics 0.200
(0.190) 0.303
H-Incentive 0.071 Commerce/Finance 0.455**
(0.207) (0.223)
M-Incentive*T10+ 0.370 Law 0.974***
(0.229) (0.313)
H-Incentive*T10+ -0.336 Arts 0.516**
(0.230) (0.261)
T10+ -0.401 Other 0.120
(0.300) (0.273)
Male 0.029
(0.126)b= b0(constant) 0.276*** Period -0.008***
(0.032) (0.276)
Log-Likelihood -1862.98 Wald 2(20) 65.22***
Robust standard error in parentheses,*p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01
Table 3: Estimation results of the risk and the noise parameters.
The estimation also shows that subjectsrisk preferences do vary with di¤erent
price frames. Subjects behave as if they are more risk averse in both Shop1-D and
Shop2-D treatments than those who are in the equivalent No-D treatments. The
estimated risk parameter is 0:784 lower in Shop1-D treatments and 0:756 lower in
Shop2-D treatments, when compared with that of the No-D treatments. These
di¤erences are large and statistically signicant at the 1% level. A base subject in
the No-D treatment (who is slightly risk loving) would pay 6:1 Dollars for a 50:50
17
gamble between receiving zero and ten Dollars. A base subject in one of the price-
framing treatments (with an r of approximately 0:65) would only be willing to pay
about 3:4 Dollars for the same gamble.
However, this di¤erence in willingness to take risks diminishes as subjects become
more familiar with the price framing. In the Shop1-D treatments, the impact on
the risk parameter due to discount framing is reduced to 0:218 in the second half
of the experiment (periods 11 to 20). A Chow Test reveals that the remaining
e¤ect on of discount framing in the rst shop is not signicantly di¤erent from zero
anymore (p > 0:27). In the Shop2-D treatments the framing e¤ect is more persistent.
The coe¢ cient of Shop2-D*T10+ o¤sets only 46% (0:346) of the total framing e¤ect
(0:756). The impact of the discount frame in shop 2 on the risk-preference parameter
remains highly signicant (p < 0:025) in the second half of the experiment.
This result seems surprising, as it implies that the knowledge that there are
discounts in shop 2 does not, as one might expect, lure people into searching more.
On the contrary, knowing that shop two o¤ers discounts persistently reduces the
search intensity compared to the situation where shop 2 posts net prices. The e¤ect
of the equivalent upwards shift of the price distribution seems to be stronger than
that of the promised discount.
Along the other dimension of our treatment design, we nd that risk preferences
are relatively stable to changes on relative price expectations. There are no signi-
cant di¤erences in the estimated risk-parameters across incentive levels. This is
the case for both the rst and last ten periods. The estimation also shows that risk
preferences tend to vary with some individual characteristics. Subjects who have
better math backgrounds are more risk-loving (r is around 0:469 higher). Subjects
who study Commerce/Finance, Arts, Law and Medicine seem to be more risk-loving
than those who study Engineering, Science, Economics and other subjects.
5 Discussion
The subjects behave as if their risk preferences were inuenced by the price-framing
conditions when the price expectations and everything else are held constant. Hold-
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ing the net price constant means that the subjects who faced identical tasks showed
systematically di¤erent risk preferences depending on how prices were framed. This
raises the question if our CRRA formulation could be the reason for this. This is not
the case, as any valid expected utility function would detect this di¤erence, since
the underlying choice tasks were identical. Furthermore, subjects respond to the
variation on relative price expectations in a way that is consistent with our choice of
parametric utility function. As we have seen above there is no signicantly di¤erent
behavior within a discount frame but across incentive condition. Just varying the
net price distributions in shops 1and 2 does not inuence the risk coe¢ cient. This
result provides support for our specication of the utility function, as well as for the
robustness of the framing e¤ect.
In what follows we discuss what might have led to the surprising result that
subjects consistently searched less if the price was framed as a shop 2 discount. We
will o¤er two explanations, one more complex explanation complexity aversion,
and a simple one shifts in salient characteristics. The observed price-framing
e¤ect may be caused by a variety of potential psychological factors. One explanation
could be complexity aversion. There is an increasing body of evidence showing
that people tend to avoid risk in more complex choices in decision-making prob-
lems under uncertainty. In a simple binary lottery choice experiment, Huck and
Weizsacker (1999) nd that subjects select the lottery with higher expected value
(EV) in general, but deviate from EV maximization more frequently as the lotteries
become more complex (i.e., the number of outcomes in the lotteries increases). This
is especially the case when the number of outcomes are di¤erent in two lotteries.
Subjects tend to choose the less complex lottery. Similar results are also found in
a multi-period lottery experiment based on discounted EUT. Mador et al. (2000)
show that subjectswillingness to pay for a simple but inferior multi-period lottery
can be signicantly higher than that of a superior but more complicated lottery
in rst-price auctions. Moreover, Sonsino et al. (2002) demonstrate that subjects
choice behavior is a¤ected by complexity in two ways: (i) subjects are less likely to
choose an alternative as the relative complexity of that alternative increases; and
(ii) the noise in the decision-making process increases with the absolute complexity
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of the choice.
Instead of focussing on the complexity of choice alternatives (Huck and Weiz-
sacker 1999, Mador et al. 2000 and Sonsino et al. 2002), Wilcox (1993) and Johnson
and Bruce (1998) investigate the behavioral impact of the complexity of whole de-
cision problems. In their studies subjects are also shown to be complexity averse.
Our results are consistent with this nding. Our two-shop search task is essen-
tially a binary lottery choice experiment with a slight complication in the discount
treatments. The baseline treatment No-D requires a binary choice between a xed
payment and a lottery payment that is determined by the price distribution in shop
2. Instead of maximizing the expected value, the subjectsobjective here is to min-
imize the expected payment. Framing the price in either of the two shops as a
gross price distribution with a discount increases the complexity of the whole search
problem, as discounts add one more dimension to the decision problem. Facing more
complex discount frames, subjects in the Shop1-D and Shop2-D treatments tend to
stick with the safe alternative (i.e., pick the xed payment) more often. This can
be seen from our structural estimation, as risk preference coe¢ cients for these two
treatments are lower, initially.
However, as subjects gain more experience with the task they gradually better
understand the real consequences of the gross price framing. Depending on where the
discount is o¤ered, the price framing increases the complexity of the search problem
by di¤erent amounts. Hence, the speed of this learning process di¤ers across the
discount treatments. Compared to the baseline treatment, Shop1-D is not much
more complex because a constant only has to be subtracted from a known number.
Overcoming complexity aversion should be quick. Indeed, we nd that the framing
e¤ect disappears in the second ten rounds in this treatment. In contrast, the Shop2-
D treatment requires the subjects to subtract a constant from a known distribution
(i.e., shifting the distribution), which adds much more complexity. Consequently,
we observe the framing e¤ect to be more persistent. The magnitude is reduced in
the second half of the experiment, but it does not vanish.
Despite complexity-aversion being a potentially plausible explanation, we favour
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another one. Suppose subjects use short-cuts in order to make their decisions.9 In
order to save cognitive resources a subject gathers the salient characteristics of a
situation and makes decisions based on them. Then in our Shop1-D treatments the
discount is clearly salient, as a subject experiences it before making a choice. This
might lead to subjects (at least initially) overvaluing the discount in their decision.
Less search than in the No-D is the consequence. However, it is not very di¢ cult
to learn that using the discount in the rst shop as a salient characteristic for the
search decision is not very sensible. The calculation of the net price is very easy,
since there are no distributions involved. Consequently, experience leads to a shift
from the discount to the net price as decision relevant.
In the Shop2-D treatments things are di¤erent. The discount is not salient as it
is not yet experienced. The immediate focus goes to the risk of searching. The risk
of searching comes from not knowing the price in the second shop and is represented
by the price distribution, which becomes salient. The expected net price and the
impact of the discount are not properly taken into account. Consequently, consumers
search less in Shop2-D than in No-D. This phenomenon is more persistent than that
in the Shop1-D case, as it needs more cognitive energy to learn that the focus on
the gross price leads to distortions in the decision. So is the net price in the second
shop with a discount partly unknown at the time of decision and cannot just be
computed as p2net = p2   d:
Our design allows us to see whether subjects really focus on the gross price in the
second shop, when there a discount is o¤ered. Take treatments 1, 4 and 9. Treat-
ments 1 and 4 are treatments without discounts, where the price distribution for the
second shop is uniform over the range of 75 to 175: Treatment 9 is the high-incentive
treatment with a discount in shop 2; where the gross price (not taking into account
the discount) is also uniformly distributed on 75 to 175: If our suspicion that subjects
only focus on the gross distribution in the latter treatment then search behavior for
given prices in shop 1 (where there are no discounts in all three treatment) should
be identical. This can be assessed graphically in the same manner as earlier in this
9Think e.g. of Gigerenzers concept of an adaptive toolbox for decision making (Gigerenzer
2001).
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Figure 2: Lowess smoothing probability of search for T1, T4 and T9
6 Conclusion
Retailers regularly post gross prices and at the same time announce discounts in-
stead of just posting net prices. This paper examined the impact of the discount
frame on search behavior. A two-stage search model was used in the laboratory for
this purpose. We designed the treatments such that the search tasks were theoretic-
ally identical across di¤erent price frames. We compared two types of experimental
treatments (in which the price in either of the shops was presented as a gross price
with a discount) to their corresponding baseline treatments (where prices in both
shops were given as net prices). The distributions where prices were drawn from
were adjusted in a way that the decision problem was identical in all three frames.
Revealed risk preferences show signicant framing e¤ects according to a structural
estimation under the assumption of constant relative risk-aversion. We found that
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people became less inclined to search if there were discounts. This reduction in
search intensity was independent of which shop actually o¤ered the discount. With
experience the framing e¤ect disappeared if the discount was o¤ered in the shop
where the consumer knew the price already. The e¤ect was persistent though if
the discount was o¤ered in the shop that the consumers had not visited yet. Con-
sequently, discount framing persistently reduced search intensity. We conclude that
rms can reduce the competitiveness of their markets by framing prices as discounts,
as search intensity is positively related to competitiveness of markets.
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A Experimental Instructions
A.1 M-Incentive & No-Discount treatment
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the instructions care-
fully. This is important, as your earnings will depend on your performance.
Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during
the experiment. If you do not obey this rule we may exclude you from the experi-
ment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to answer
your questions individually.
The currency in this game is called E-Dollars. At the end of the game we will
convert the E-Dollars you have earned in the game to real money. The exchange
rate is 100 E-Dollars =0.6 Australian Dollars.
 Your task
Suppose you want to buy one unit of a certain good. You value the good at 200
E-Dollars. Your prot will either be this valuation (200 E-Dollars) minus the price
you pay for the good if you decide to buy, or zero if you do not buy the good.
There are two shops, which may sell at di¤erent prices. The prices at each shop
are determined randomly and independently. However, you do not know the
prices until you have arrived at a particular shop. The only things you know in
advance are that the price is drawn according to the rules given below, and that
you will be granted a discount of 15 E-Dollars at the second shop (because
you have got a rebate voucher). You also know that moving from shop 1 to
2 will lead to a search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
The prices at both shops will be in the range between 75 and 175 E-Dollars,
where all prices are equally likely. You can think of the following: Shopkeeper one
draws randomly from an urn with balls numbered 75 to 175. The number of the
ball he draws is the price. Shopkeeper two has his own urn with balls numbered 75
to 175, where he draws from.
The games timing is as follows:
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1. You arrive at shop 1 and observe the price at shop 1 (P1). You have three
options:
(a) EXIT, the game ends and your prot is zero.
(b) BUY HERE, the game ends and your prot is 200  P1:
(c) GO TO THE NEXT SHOP, you learn the price of the second shop (P2)
and incur search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
2. If you have chosen to go to the next shop you learn the price charged by the
second shop (P2). You have two options now, which both end the game:
(a) EXIT, with a total prot of  5:
(b) BUY, which gives you a total prot of 200 P2 5. Note that 5 represents
the cost of moving from shop 1 to shop 2.
The diagram below summarizes the game:
Stage 1 Stage 2
Observe p1: 1: Exit (profit = 0)
2: Buy (profit = 200  p1)
3: Search (i.e., go to shop 2, observe p2)! 3.1: Exit (profit =  5)
3.2: Buy (profit = 200  p2   5)
 Repetition
You will play 20 of these games in succession. Note that the prices are newly
drawn in each of the games. The prices are independent across games. Prices are
not inuenced by the prices of the previous game. If you have any questions please
raise your hand. We will come and answer your question.
A.2 M-Incentive & Shop1-Discount treatment
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the instructions care-
fully. This is important, as your earnings will depend on your performance.
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Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during
the experiment. If you do not obey this rule we may exclude you from the experi-
ment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to answer
your questions individually.
The currency in this game is called E-Dollars. At the end of the game we will
convert the E-Dollars you have earned in the game to real money. The exchange
rate is 100 E-Dollars =0.6 Australian Dollars.
 Your task
Suppose you want to buy one unit of a certain good. You value the good at 200
E-Dollars. Your prot will either be this valuation (200 E-Dollars) minus the price
you pay for the good if you decide to buy, or zero if you do not buy the good.
There are two shops, which may sell at di¤erent prices. The prices at each shop
are determined randomly and independently. However, you do not know the
prices until you have arrived at a particular shop. The only things you know in
advance are that the price is drawn according to the rules given below, and that
you will be granted a discount of 15 E-Dollars at the second shop (because
you have got a rebate voucher). You also know that moving from shop 1 to
2 will lead to a search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
The price at shop 1 is in the range between 90 and 190 E-Dollars, where all prices
are equally likely. You can think of the following: Shopkeeper one draws randomly
from an urn with balls numbered 90 to 190. The number of the ball he draws is the
price. The price at shop 2 is in the range between 75 and 175 E-Dollars, where all
prices are equally likely. Shopkeeper two has his own urn with balls numbered 75
to 175, where he draws from.
The games timing is as follows:
1. You arrive at shop 1 and observe the price at shop 1 (P1). You have three
options:
(a) EXIT, the game ends and your prot is zero.
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(b) BUY HERE, the game ends and your prot is 200   P1 + 15: Note that
+15 represents the discount if you buy from the rst shop.
(c) GO TO THE NEXT SHOP, you learn the price of the second shop (P2)
and incur search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
2. If you have chosen to go to the next shop you learn the price charged by the
second shop (P2). You have two options now, which both end the game:
(a) EXIT, with a total prot of  5:
(b) BUY, which gives you a total prot of 200 P2 5. Note that 5 represents
the cost of moving from shop 1 to shop 2.
The diagram below summarizes the game:
Stage 1 Stage 2
Observe p1: 1: Exit (profit = 0)
2: Buy (profit = 200  p1 + 15)
3: Search (i.e., go to shop 2, observe p2)! 3.1: Exit (profit =  5)
3.2: Buy (profit = 200  p2   5)
 Repetition
You will play 20 of these games in succession. Note that the prices are newly
drawn in each of the games. The prices are independent across games. Prices are
not inuenced by the prices of the previous game. If you have any questions please
raise your hand. We will come and answer your question.
A.3 M-Incentive & Shop2-Discount treatment
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please read the instructions care-
fully. This is important, as your earnings will depend on your performance.
Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with other participants during
the experiment. If you do not obey this rule we may exclude you from the experi-
ment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to answer
your questions individually.
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The currency in this game is called E-Dollars. At the end of the game we will
convert the E-Dollars you have earned in the game to real money. The exchange
rate is 100 E-Dollars =0.6 Australian Dollars.
 Your task
Suppose you want to buy one unit of a certain good. You value the good at 200
E-Dollars. Your prot will either be this valuation (200 E-Dollars) minus the price
you pay for the good if you decide to buy, or zero if you do not buy the good.
There are two shops, which may sell at di¤erent prices. The prices at each shop
are determined randomly and independently. However, you do not know the
prices until you have arrived at a particular shop. The only things you know in
advance are that the price is drawn according to the rules given below, and that
you will be granted a discount of 15 E-Dollars at the second shop (because
you have got a rebate voucher). You also know that moving from shop 1 to
2 will lead to a search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
The price at shop 1 is in the range between 75 and 175 E-Dollars, where all
prices are equally likely. You can think of the following: Shopkeeper one draws
randomly from an urn with balls numbered 75 to 175. The number of the ball he
draws is the price. The price at shop 2 is in the range between 90 and 190 E-
Dollars, where all prices are equally likely. Shopkeeper two has his own urn with
balls numbered 90 to 190, where he draws from.
The games timing is as follows:
1. You arrive at shop 1 and observe the price at shop 1 (P1). You have three
options:
(a) EXIT, the game ends and your prot is zero.
(b) BUY HERE, the game ends and your prot is 200  P1:
(c) GO TO THE NEXT SHOP, you learn the price of the second shop (P2)
and incur search cost of 5 E-Dollars.
2. If you have chosen to go to the next shop you learn the price charged by the
second shop (P2). You have two options now, which both end the game:
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(a) EXIT, with a total prot of  5:
(b) BUY, which gives you a total prot of 200   P2 + 15   5. Note that  5
represents the cost of moving from shop 1 to shop 2, while the +15 is the
discount if you buy from the second shop.
The diagram below summarizes the game:
Stage 1 Stage 2
Observe p1: 1: Exit (profit = 0)
2: Buy (profit = 200  p1)
3: Search (i.e., go to shop 2, observe p2)! 3.1: Exit (profit =  5)
3.2: Buy (profit = 200  p2 + 15  5)
 Repetition
You will play 20 of these games in succession. Note that the prices are newly
drawn in each of the games. The prices are independent across games. Prices are
not inuenced by the prices of the previous game. If you have any questions please
raise your hand. We will come and answer your question.
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